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Superpumper v. Leonard, 137 Nev. Adv. Op. 43 (Sept. 30, 2001)1 
 




 The Nevada Supreme Court considered whether state district court has proper subject 
matter jurisdiction over fraudulent conveyance actions, or if bankruptcy courts have exclusive 
jurisdiction over these matters. The court concluded that pursuant to In re Gruntz and In re 
McCarthy, state and federal bankruptcy courts share concurrent jurisdiction over fraudulent 
conveyance actions, therefore the district court had proper subject matter jurisdiction over this 
case.2 
 
Facts and Procedural History: 
In 2007, Morabito filed a lawsuit against the Herbsts, who filed a counterclaim. The court 
found for the Herbsts and awarded $149.4 million in damages, but the parties later settled for $85 
million. Morabito, however, had already transferred most of his assets out of his name, and then 
defaulted on the settlement agreement. The transferees include: Superpumper, Inc.; Morabito’s 
brother, Sam; Edward Bayuk, Trustee of the Bayuk Trust; and Snowshoe Petroleum, Inc. The 
Herbsts filed an involuntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition to initiate proceedings and the 
bankruptcy court adjudicated Morabito as a Chapter 7 debtor. The Herbsts filed a fraudulent 
transfer action, in state district court, against Morabito and the transferees of his assets under 
NRS Chapter 112.3  The transferees, collectively known as Superpumper, and the Herbsts 
stipulated to substitute Morabito’s court appointed trustee, Leonard, for the Herbsts and to 
remove Morabito as a defendant.  
During discovery, Superpumper received notice of the Trustee’s intent to depose 
Morabito’s and Superpumper’s attorney, Dennis Vacco. In response, Superpumper filed a motion 
to challenge that deposition and protect its attorney-client communication under the common-
interest privilege. The district court admitted the communications into trial, holding that the 
common-interest privilege did not apply. The state district court ultimately avoided all of 
Morabito’s transfers to Superpumper and awarded the subject property or value thereof to 




The district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the fraudulent conveyance action 
 
 Regarding the first argument (i.e., that the district court did not have subject matter 
jurisdiction), Superpumper cited In re Gruntz to support its assertion that the bankruptcy court 
has exclusive jurisdiction over “core proceedings” and fraudulent transfer proceedings are “core 
proceedings,” thus the bankruptcy court has exclusive jurisdiction over the fraudulent 
 
1  By Tali Frey. 
2  In re Gruntz, 202 F.3d 1074; In re McCarthy, 230 B.R. 414. 
3  NEV. REV. STAT. § 112 (2021). 
conveyance action in this case.4 The court does not determine whether, as a proceeding that 
could only arise in the context of a bankruptcy proceeding, a fraudulent conveyance action 
constitutes a “core proceeding,”5 because, the court rejects Superpumper’s argument that “core 
proceedings” are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court. The court notes that 
while Federal district courts “have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under title 11,”6 
the district courts also, “shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings 
arising under title 11 . . . .”7 Additionally, the court highlights the permissive, not mandatory, 
nature of the bankruptcy court’s responsibility in determining core proceedings, by emphasizing 
that bankruptcy judges “may hear and determine…core proceedings arising under title 11.”8  
The court then looks to Gruntz and the Supreme Court decision in Executive Benefits 
Insurance Agency v. Arkison to demonstrate that whether a proceeding is “core” is unrelated to 
whether a state court has jurisdiction over the issue.9 A matter that is “core” only determines 
whether a bankruptcy court may enter a final judgement and the appropriate standard of review 
for that judgement. The court expressly states that Gruntz did not overrule In re McCarthy which 
held that there is not exclusive federal jurisdiction over a “core proceeding.”10  The Superpumper 
court follows McCarthy and rules that state and federal courts share concurrent jurisdiction over 
fraudulent transfer actions.  
Regarding the second argument, (i.e., the Trustee did not have standing), the court 
determines that under NRS 112.210(1)(a) and 11 U.S.C. §544, the Trustee has both an obligation 
and the authority to recover fraudulent conveyances for the bankruptcy estate. Therefore, the 
Trustee had standing to maintain the action. 
 
Superpumper waived its in rem jurisdiction argument 
 
Regarding the third argument, (i.e., the district court did not have in rem jurisdiction over 
the Bayuk Trust), Superpumper argued that the court lacked in rem jurisdiction over the Bayuk 
Trust because only Edward Bayuk was named in the transfer, and not the trust itself. The court 
found that in rem jurisdiction is analogous to personal jurisdiction. Pursuant to NRCP 
12(h)(1)(B), a defense of lack of personal jurisdiction is waived unless is it asserted in a 
responsive pleading.11 The court notes that this is distinguishable from a defense of lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction which may be raised at any time. Therefore, the court finds that 
Superpumper waived its argument of lack on in rem jurisdiction because it was not mentioned in 
the responsive pleading.  
 
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed attorney-client communications to 
be disclosed during discovery and admitted into evidence at trial 
 
Regarding the fourth argument, (i.e., the district court erred in allowing attorney-client 
communications to be disclosed during discovery and admitted into evidence at trial), 
 
4  In re Gruntz, 202 F.3d 1074, 1080-81 (9th Cir. 2000). 
5  Id. at 1081. 
6  28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (2005).  
7  Id. at § 1334(b). 
8  Id. at § 157(b)(1). 
9  Executive Benefits Insurance Agency v. Arkison, 573 U.S. 25, 33-34 (2014); see Gruntz, 202 F.3d at 1081. 
10  In re McCarthy, 230 B.R. 414, 418 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1999). 
11  NEV. R. CIV. PROC. 12(h)(1)(B). 
Superpumper argued that the district court erred in determining that the common-interest 
privilege did not apply to its communications. The court, however, found that because 
Superpumper did not specify which communications were privileged, Superpumper did not meet 
its burden of proving that the privilege was applicable. Additionally, on appeal, Superpumper did 
not indicate that there would have been a different result had the communications been 
prohibited. Therefore, the court rejects Superpumper’s final argument that the district court erred 
in allowing the communications to be admitted into evidence at trial.   
 
Conclusion: 
First, the court concluded that state and federal bankruptcy courts share concurrent 
jurisdiction over fraudulent conveyance actions, therefore the district court had proper subject 
matter jurisdiction over this case. Second, the court found that the Trustee had standing to 
maintain the fraudulent conveyance action because Trustee’s have the authority and obligation to 
recover fraudulent transfers for the bankruptcy estate. Third, the court held that in rem 
jurisdiction is analogous to personal jurisdiction and the defense to lack of either must be raised 
in a preanswer motion or responsive pleading. Superpumper failed to assert this defense at the 
proper time and thus waived its in rem jurisdiction argument. Finally, the court maintained that 
Superpumper failed to meet its burden of proving that the privilege was applicable to its 
attorney-client communications, or that it was prejudiced by their admission, so the district court 
did not err in admitting the communications into evidence. Judgement affirmed.  
